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Abstract
Despite numerous attempts to reorganize state government aimed at streamlining, reducing,
and creating greater efficiencies, the size and scope of Connecticut’s administrative apparatus
has grown considerably over a fifty year period. This study will trace the political history of
previous reorganization efforts with a particular emphasis on more recent attempts such as the
Etherington (1970), Filer (1976), Gengras (1977), Thomas (1991), and Hull-Harper
Commissions (1992). Observed trends follow national patterns:
1) reorganization
commissions are cyclical in nature and more likely to be undertaken in the wake of similar
efforts at the federal level and 2) they are more likely to be undertaken during periods of state
fiscal retrenchment. A movement away from comprehensive reform efforts to incremental
approaches is another cross-national pattern that has been detected in recent reform efforts.
A review of Connecticut’s experience with state reorganization demonstrates that despite the
concerted effort by both the executive and legislative branches to alter administrative
structures, reorganization recommendations are seldom implemented due to the opposition of
the state legislature and interest groups.
Keywords: Administrative structures, Connecticut State, Reorganize, Politics
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1. Introduction
With severe fiscal crises affecting state governments across the United States, governors are
increasingly turning to state reorganization as a tool to reign in government spending and
close budget gaps for fiscal year 2011 (National Governors Association 2010). While
Connecticut has experienced budget deficits periodically since the 1970s, the current budget
deficit is the largest in state history.
With an eye towards a more efficient and effective
government, Connecticut governors since Wilbur Cross have utilized their powers to initiate
state reorganization as a means to achieve greater control over the executive branch and in
more recent years to reign in government spending. Yet despite numerous attempts to
reorganize state government aimed at streamlining, reducing, and creating greater efficiencies,
the size and scope of Connecticut’s administrative apparatus has grown considerably over a
fifty year period. This increase in the size and scope of government raises the question of
how effective state reorganization efforts have been in the past and what the future prospects
are for those who attempt the same.
This study will trace the political history of state reorganization with a particular emphasis on
more recent attempts such as the Etherington (1970), Filer (1976), Gengras (1977), Thomas
(1989-91), and Hull-Harper Commissions (1992). Administrative reorganization has been
an abiding concern among state governments since the advent of the Progressive Era’s quest
to create a science of management. Connecticut’s attempts at reorganization mirror national
patterns in the following respects: 1) state reorganization is cyclical in nature and more
likely to be undertaken in the wake of similar efforts at the federal level, 2) it is more likely to
be undertaken during periods of state fiscal retrenchment and 3) since the 1990s,
reorganization has retreated from comprehensive reform efforts in favor of more incremental
and piecemeal approaches. In terms of prospects for the adoption and implementation of
reorganization plans, a review of Connecticut’s experience demonstrates that despite the
concerted effort by governors to alter administrative structures and streamline government
operations, reorganization recommendations are seldom implemented in their entirety due to
the opposition of the state legislature and interest groups.
Finally, the paper will offer
some predictions with respect to Governor Malloy’s most recent proposal to reorganize state
government in light of lessons drawn from previous gubernatorial attempts at reorganization
in Connecticut.
2. The Rage to Reorganize
The interest in government reorganization has been a century-old struggle that was born out
of the scientific management movement at the turn of the twentieth century. As James
Conant (1988) observed, the wellsprings of state reorganization was Woodrow Wilson’s
(1887) seminal work “The Study of Administration”. The first to suggest that there should
be a separate discipline known as government administration distinct from politics, this
politics/administration dichotomy led to other Progressive Era reformers to emphasize the
now familiar and oft repeated mantras of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy as the
guiding principles of the new science of administration.
Soon to follow were government
attempts to implement these principles beginning with the Brownlow Committee Report of
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1937 which was inspired by Luther and Gulick’s (1937) “Papers on the Science of
Administration”. Chief executives, be they presidents or governors, have sought to achieve
greater organizational control as they endeavored to “faithfully execute the laws.” Staking
their careers on their ability to effectively implement their policy agendas, chief executives
have had to contend with unwieldy organizational structures that have grown in a haphazard
or unplanned fashion, often by accretion over the course of time. The net result has
impeded gubernatorial efforts to exert greater control over the executive branch. In
Connecticut, various commissions have been convened at periodic intervals throughout the
twentieth century, at the behest of governors, to study and make recommendations regarding
administrative structures.
Collectively, these efforts have comprised part of a larger tradition in the United States
known as the administrative reorganization movement. AE Buck’s seminal work The
Reorganization of State Governments in the United States (1938) took the general principles
set forth by federal reformers and applied them to state government. The major principles
or goals of state reorganization according to Buck are: 1) concentration of authority within
the chief executive, 2) functional integration of independent agencies, 3) the avoidance of
boards for purely administrative work, 4) coordination of staff services, 5) independent audits,
and 6) recognition of a governor’s cabinet. Taken together these principles also comprise
what Bell (1974) termed “the cabinet” model of government which sought to give the
governor greater control over the executive branch through fewer agencies, a high degree of
functional consolidation, and the ability of the governor to appoint department heads.
With respect to the first of Buck’s principles, the call for greater executive control was in
reaction to the deliberate creation of weak state governors by colonial legislatures. Owing
to the British colonial experience, the framers of state constitution were reluctant to vest too
much power in the chief executive. In fact, as Devine (2006) observed: “During the
Revolutionary period, many considered governors tyrants for enforcing what were perceived
to be the abusive policies of King George III. From this came the stigmatization of
gubernatorial power that discouraged a strong governorship through early U.S. history.” (p.
29)
Since many states were still living under constitutions that were designed during colonial
times, conventions were called during the 1960’s prompted primarily by the need to comply
with the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Reyonolds v. Sims (1964) that called for “one man,
one vote”.
While at the conventions, delegates addressed other outstanding issues in order
to modernize their state governments. In reference to the executive branch, however, only
two major provisions touch upon gubernatorial powers with respect to constitutional grants of
authority that brings to bear upon state reorganization. Article Fourth is a tersely worded
portion of the Connecticut state constitution which in section five vests supreme executive
power in the governor and section twelve that states “He shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.” (CSG Article Fourth). Endeavoring to faithfully executive the laws,
governors have run headlong into a variety of institutional roadblocks. Despite the
clarification of language in the 1965 constitution that granted the governor executive powers,
when they have attempted to use their powers to reorganize the executive branch agencies
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entailing the consolidation or elimination of agencies, the state legislature has not always
cooperated. In some cases, it has looked upon with disfavor such actions as breaching
separation of powers principles by treading into a domain that they viewed as their legislative
prerogative. This has been especially the case with respect to boards and commissions.
State legislatures, as Conant points out, (2000) created these entities to oversee the programs
and agencies they created which often lay outside the control of the governor. Independent
boards and commissions have been problematic for governors throughout the United States
and their reorganization or merger into cabinet departments and/or abolishment have often
met with fierce resistance from clientele groups.
Accompanying the rise of a more modernized state government apparatus vis a vis
constitutional reform, there also emerged what Sabato (1983) identified as a new type of
governor. No longer content to be relegated to secondary status behind state legislatures, “a
“new breed’ of governor graced statehouses beginning in the 1980s poised to assume greater
responsibility for administrative matters.”
While reducing the size and scope of government has been sought in tandem with reform
efforts, it is often a secondary goal.
In fact, some scholars have viewed the
economy/efficiency imperative as a rhetorical device employed by governors to provide
legitimacy for political interests. (Garnett 1980)
In Connecticut, there have been several
commissions which span the better part of the 20th century in an attempt to capture these
principles within state government. The work of these commissions and their results
comprise the bulk of the following analysis.
3. Literature Review
Reorganization began at the federal level of government and later spread among the fifty
states. The general principles were subsequently adopted by state governments in four
consecutive waves.
The wave metaphor was first coined by James Garnett (1980) and
covers the times periods of (1914-1936), (1937-1946), (1947-1975), and the late 1970s to the
present. Each of these successive time periods was inspired by federal efforts and parallels
many of the same foci of concern present at the federal level. During the first half of the
20th century, The Taft, Brownlow and Hoover Commissions were the primary catalysts for
reform. The Brownlow Committee, commissioned to study the executive branch of federal
government under FDR, underscored the importance of such management principles as unity
of command and a limited span of control, which, while well recognized, were not being put
into practice (Conant 1988, 893). Similarly, the Hoover Commission, chaired by former
president Herbert Hoover, set off a wave of reform effort in the states referred to as the Little
Hoover commissions (Heady 1952).
While scholars have been in disagreement as to why reorganization occurs, they have
generally isolated two or three key factors that appear to be salient.
In referring to this
confluence of factors, Chakerian (1996) captures this sentiment well with the following
observation:
Fundamental long-term trends in economic performance as well as trends in what is
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fashionable in policy affect demands for governmental actions by political interests. These
pressures for action, however, must cope with an institutional environment that may facilitate
or block access to the governmental decision agenda. (p. 28)
Economic factors such as fiscal crises are often the impetus for state reorganization efforts,
particularly in the latter part of the 20th century. After a long period of economic growth
during the Post World War II era which continued unabated through the advent of Great
Society, new state services and regulations required increased government expenditures.
The size and scope of government was increasing without the accompanying managerial
control mechanisms to guide much of the new activities. During economic boom periods
immediately after World War II, reorganization was not viewed mainly as an attempt to reign
in government spending but rather as an end in and of itself to promote better structural
alignment for more efficient service delivery. As economic downturns and inflationary
pressures during the 1970s’ began to strain state budgets, state reorganization was viewed as a
means to streamline government and achieve cost savings. In his cross-national study
covering the period of 1900-1985, Conant (1992) found that state reorganization efforts were
undertaken in the midst of periodic fiscal crises confronted by state governments. Similarly,
Garnett (1980) and Chackerian (1996) also found empirical support for the proposition that
state reorganization efforts among the states were preceded by long-wave economic decline.
Compounding these economic downturns was a gradual increase in the size of government.
With the advent of Great Society federal programs, the 1960s gave rise to increased state
expenditures due to massive increases in state services and regulations. The size and scope
of government was increasing without the accompanying managerial control mechanisms to
guide much of the new activities.
While economic downturns undoubtedly lend a sense of urgency and provide a rational for
governors to legitimize reorganization, alone they are not sufficient to achieve the adoption of
reorganization plans.
Governors may initiate reorganization efforts, however the
institutional environment has been shown to be a key factor in the likelihood of adoption of
reform measures by state legislatures. As a co-equal branch, party control of state
legislatures is an important explanatory variable. Institutional power struggles between the
executive and legislative branch often occur over reorganization due to the legislature’s
concern over loss of control (Chi 1992). Chakerian (1996, 36) hypothesized that
reorganizations would be more likely to occur when there is high legislative party
competition, when the governor’s party controls the legislature and during long-wave
economic downturns. However, the expected finding that the governor’s party control of
the legislature coupled with legislative competition would result in more frequent state
reorganizations is at odds with his findings. In fact, after conducting a cross national study,
he found that these conditions were actually less propitious for formal reorganization events.
Formal reorganization events were fewer when the governor and the majority in the
legislature shared the same party label. He posited that under conditions of party control,
the governor will not have to resort to formal reorganization mechanisms to achieve his/her
managerial objectives. Informal channels of control can accomplish the same objectives in
a less costly and contentious manner.
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While cross-national studies in the area of state reorganization have been important in
delineating general trends and patterns among the states, this study will utilize a case study
approach. Connecticut shares some similarities with its sister states, it also posses certain
characteristics that make it a divergent case in some important respects. By utilizing a case
study method, this paper will capture some of the complexities and level of contextual detail
not afforded by other cross-national comparisons.
4. Scope of Reorganization Efforts
Inspired by AE Buck and Luther Gulick, early state reform efforts during the first three waves
were far reaching in scope (Rabin and Dodd 1985).
The reorganization literature
distinguishes between two major types of reorganization, comprehensive and incremental
(Berkman and Reenock 2004). Comprehensive reorganization entails “the creation,
abolition or the reorganization of at least four discrete agencies involving a total of four or
more functional areas” (Garnet 1980, 285). Comprehensive state reorganization efforts
were characterized by their ambitious plans to effect sweeping overhauls of administrative
structures. These often entailed studying the machinery of state government with an eye
towards streamlining and modernizing the entire administrative apparatus. Typically
commissions charged with the task of reorganization often attempted to study every agency
within the executive branch in order to encounter the optimal administrative structure which
would foster greater managerial control. Comprehensive reorganization has a number of
advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages, comprehensive organization permits
the legislature to consider the plan in its entirety. On the other hand, Young (2003) found
that:
Disadvantages to comprehensive restructuring legislation are mainly that some of the
portions of the proposed legislation are so controversial or otherwise unacceptable to the
legislature that the whole restructuring bill atrophies or dies. (p. 16)
Furthermore, Conant (1988, 894) found that the primary reason for abandoning such large
scale reorganization efforts was due to legislative resistance. Further fueling skepticism of
comprehensive reform efforts were lingering doubts about the true cost savings associated
with reorganizations which were often difficult, if not impossible, to document.
Some scholars (Chakerian 1996; Chi 1992) have taken to task the portrayal or
characterization of anything less than total reorganization as failure and instead have argued
for a revised understanding of what they term partial or incremental consolidation.
Restructuring activities may occur in piecemeal fashion over a period of time rather than in
one fell swoop.
These ongoing efforts may be just as important and yield substantial
outcomes even though they occur gradually. Berkman and Reenock (2004) have argued for
a revised understanding of reorganization to include what they term incremental
consolidation. These restructuring activities occur in piecemeal fashion over a period of time,
including different time periods. As Rabin and Dodd (1985) observed, “reorganizing since
1981 has been more incremental involving only a few agencies at a time.”
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Table 1

Connecticut State Reorganization 1970-1977

Year

Commission

Type
Reorganization

1971

Etherington

comprehensive

1976

Filer

comprehensive

of

Implemention by State
Legislature

Recommendations

821

reduce departments
from 23-16

Creation of the Department of
Commerce and Motor Vehicles
Departments reduced to 21
Creation of OPM
Creation of DAS

1977

Gengras

partial

biennial budget
zero-based budgeting
program budgeting
strengthen governor's
role in collective
Bargaining

biennial budget
program budgeting

Changes that occur incrementally over time may be no less significant than those undertaken
in a comprehensive fashion. Reorganization plans and ideas that were raised in earlier time
periods and not implemented may be subsequently gain favor by later legislatures.
As Table 1 illustrates, attempts to reorganize state government in Connecticut adhere to some
of the general patterns and trends detected in other states. State reorganizations during the
1970s were undertaken in the midst of economic downturns and fiscal crisis and were
generally comprehensive in scope. During the 1990s, economic downturns and fiscal crisis
characterized the two major attempts at reorganization. The Hull-Harper Commission
(1992) did diverge from the trend away from comprehensive reorganization in its initial
mandate which was limited in scope. In actuality, the commission achieved far greater
success than all other previous commissions by merging and consolidating four major
agencies.
5. A Brief History of State Reorganization in Connecticut
While the first reorganization effort began as early as 1935 under Governor Wilbur Cross,
this paper will focus on more recent reorganization commissions that have occurred since
1970. An overview of these reorganization efforts demonstrates that Connecticut follows
many similar patterns as its sister states in terms of the timing and scope of reform efforts as
well the same pitfalls issues with respect to the adoption and implementation of plans.
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5.1. The Etherington Commission (1970): Into the Ether
There were two major reorganization attempts during the 1970s which Gargan (2000) dubbed
“the Golden Era of State Reorganization”. Fiscal crisis served as the backdrop for the
Etherington Commission. As noted by the government watchdog group Connecticut Public
Expenditure Council:
General fund spending had risen by 483% and the number of state employees by 69%
between FY 1960 and 1972. This vast expansion of government, the commission said, would
create continued pressure for higher taxes. More self-discipline within government and a
reorganization of the executive branch were urgently needed to enable to the state to continue
to delivery needed services while avoiding the need to raise economically burdensome new
taxes. (CPEC, 7)
The Governor’s Commission on Services and Expenditures (1970) otherwise known as the
Etherington Commission, was illustrative of the types of reform efforts underway throughout
many of the states during the 1970s. The commission, appointed by Republican Governor
Meskill, was mainly comprised of business executives, was privately funded and worked
without legislative authorization. The commission’s work was comprehensive and resulted
in 821 recommendations which covered ninety-one departments, agencies, boards and
commissions. The major thrust of the proposals was to streamline and consolidate agencies
in order to reduce the number from thirty three to fifteen all under the governor’s control
(CPEC, 8). However, many of the commission’s recommendations never saw the light of
day. As Morton Tenzer, a long-time scholar and observer of Connecticut state government
put it:
The General Assembly, however, with Democratic majorities in both House and Senate, was
skeptical of the validity of the commission appointed by Governor Meskill.
Just as
Republican-dominated legislatures have failed to enact the recommendations of the
Democratic governors Cross and Bowles, the legislature in 1972 did not undertake
enactment of the Etherington Commission Recommendations. (Tenzer, p. 158).
This finding is illustrative of the one of the key dynamics related to the relative success in
terms of legislative adoption of reorganization plans. The important institutional variable
referenced earlier can be seen at work in this case. It also illustrates Conant’s 22 state study
finding that the most successful state reorganization efforts occurred in instances of low or
moderate gubernatorial/legislative conflict (1988, 895).
In actuality, some of the more modest recommendations made by the Etherington
Commission were adopted by the state legislature. For instance, the creation of a new
Department of Commerce and the reorganization of the Department of Motor Vehicles were a
few of the items that survived the legislative process.
Perhaps owing to the fact that
Democrats held a majority during this time period, 47% of the 151 recommendations
requiring legislative action were judged not to be worthy of implementation, as opposed to
just 18% of the 684 requiring executive action.” (CPEC, p. 9) Those that were rejected by
the legislature included the consolidation of the Treasurer’s and Comptroller’s Offices and
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Finance and Control and Tax Departments into one agency. Also jettisoned were proposals
to eliminate independent governing boards for state institutions of higher education and to
separate the Farmington Health Center from the University Connecticut. As Tenzer further
noted, that despite the aforementioned changes, the Connecticut state government “still
remained basically “unreformed” as far as the basic structure of its operations.” (Tenzer, 149).
5.2. The Filer Commission (1976): Reorganizing Without Reducing the Size of
Government
The Filer Commission on the Structure of State Government, so named after John Filer, a
former Republican state senator and chairman of Aetna Life and Casualty was convened in
1976.
Fiscal crisis was once again the backdrop for this commission as it had been for the
previous Etherington Commission.
Now that the commission operated during a
Democratically-controlled legislature and under Democratic Governor Ella Grasso, it should
have been a propitious circumstance to undertake reorganization. The Filer Commission
recommendations fared somewhat better than its predecessor. After intense lobbying by
various special interest groups, the proposal to reduce cabinet level departments from 26 to
13 resulted in only a reduction down to 21 departments. While only a partial victory, the
Filer Commission did make its mark on Connecticut state government most notably for the
creation of two major staff agencies, the Office of Policy and Management and the
Department of Administrative Services.
A review of the legislative debates in the spring of 1977 provides a glimpse at how the
recommendations of the Filer Commission fared in the General Assembly. Deliberations on
Senate Bill 357 An Act concerning the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of State
Government on May 23, 1977 commenced after several months of work on the bill by the
Government and Administration Policy Committee. Senator Wayne Baker, the co-sponsor
of the bill, introduced the day’s proceedings by outlining the principles guiding the bill. A
passage from Baker’s speech carries several of Buck’s tenets for good state government
including unity of command, span of control and functional government. Baker prefaced
his introductory remarks with the observation of the rapid expansion of state government and
the accompanying creation of new organizational units without consideration for the existing
structure. Connecticut needed to structurally align agencies to match this new growth in
order to facilitate service delivery.
We have followed certain principles in the bill…There should be fewer departments reporting
to the Governor. It is impossible for a governor to manage an extremely large number of
independent departments and it is equally difficult for that Governor to establish priorities
where every agency has as much access as the Department of Health, the Department of
Consumer Protection or Economic Development. (p. 11)
To its credit, unlike the Etherington Commission, the Filer Commission did make an attempt
to be more participatory by holding public hearings around the state in order to solicit input
from various stakeholders in state government. In fact, in registering his opposition to the
bill Senator Hudson remarked about the lobbying activity with the following: “I have been
extremely displeased with the carryings on of some of the members of state government and
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lobby groups outside of state government in their attempts to impress upon us their position.”
(p. 27) In an effort to be inclusive, however, they may have unwittingly provided more
opportunities for opposition to express their disapproval for the plan and thereby preserve
some of the agencies slated for elimination. Groups that testified during public hearings
were the State Employees Association, the League of Women Voters, and major department
heads of state government agencies (p.9). Twenty-eight unaffiliated agencies outside the
control of the governor remained intact as the result of interest group lobbying.
During
legislative deliberations, some Senators expressed their opposition to the bill. The
objections ranged from the view that the reorganization plan was either too bold or in some
cases did not go far enough. For example, Senator Hudson did not believe that
reorganization should be wielded like an ax to get rid of commissions without consideration
as to how well they might be functioning (Senate proceedings, May 23, 1977.
Other
Senators expressed doubts that the reorganization would bring about cost savings and
reduction in personnel that have been advertised by the bill’s proponents. One senator asked
whether the state would still have 45,000 employees and another remarked that there was no
indication as to how the bill would control costs (Senate proceedings, May 23, 1977, p. 94).
In a final plea for Senate Bill 357 before the final vote was taken, Senator Hudson offered the
following remarks:
Political parties have alternated in power, societies change, state population has doubled in
Connecticut and the economy has risen up and down. What has not changed over the years
is the observation by all of the reorganization commissions that the executive branch of
Connecticut government needs to be structured so that it can be more accountable to the
people and their representatives. The Cross Commission stated the thesis in 1937 when it
noted in its report that the principles of administrative decentralization and of checks and
balances have been carried to an extreme in this organization… There is strong support for
this reorganization effort by the public. (Senate Proceedings, May 23, 1977, p. 77)
Senate Bill 357 passed with 29 voting in favor and 7 opposed.
The most significant development to emerge from the Filer Commission was the creation of
the Office of Policy and Management which centralized staff planning and analysis in the
governor’s office adding considerable policy expertise as well as a mechanism to assist the
governor in formulating the budget. Underscoring the centrality of OPM’s role in the
executive branch, Tenzer offered the following:
After the Governor, the Secretary of OPM is the most powerful person in state government.
The Secretary not only works closely with the Governor to formulate the budget, but he also
becomes the chief lobbyist promoting the budget to the legislature. All other state agencies
may be helped to expand their activities by favorable decisions made at OPM, or conversely,
may have their programs diminished by negative judgments about their requests. (Tenzer, p.
157)
Since 1977, OPM has been a mainstay in the executive branch and a source of gubernatorial
power and expertise. As the right arm of the chief executive, OPM prepares the governor’s
budget, coordinates interagency policies and intergovernmental relations.
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5.3. The Gengras Commission Financial Management Task Force (1977)
Once again, financial crisis was the backdrop for the Gengras Commission convened by
Democratic Governor Grasso. Despite the imposition of a sales tax increase, Connecticut
had a $140,000,000 budget deficit that prompted further borrowing. It was amid these
difficulties that Governor Grasso sought to improve the state’s financial management by
creating a commission whose charge was to identify ways to improve financial practices
(CPEC, 16). Like other state governments during the 1970s, Connecticut experienced a
burgeoning of programs in health, welfare, and regulation without the accompanying
managerial capabilities to support these new responsibilities. Among the recommendations
made by the Commission were updating accounting and control systems, better planning and
budgeting, the use of long-range financial planning horizons and the provision of more timely
information to make policy decisions.
The commission also included measures to assist with the implementation of the
recommendations such as a two-year financial plan, program budgeting and zero based
budgeting.
While numerous bills were introduced during the 1978 and 1979 legislative
sessions, many were not acted upon. The commission report supported the Filer proposal to
create the Office of Policy and Management.
It also sought to address the state’s financial
planning, budgeting and control processes which were found to be inadequate.
Table 2
Year

Commission

Connecticut State Reorganization 1990-2011
Recommendations

1989

Thomas

Type of
Reorg.
Comp.

1992

Hull-Harper

Partial

Centralization of
technology functions
Appointment of chief
operating officer
to oversee agencies
Creation of management
division in OPM
Return to biennial
Budgeting
Privatization of
certain state services
12 health and human
services consolidated
into four
Reorganization of higher
ed
Consolidate the Dept.
of Developmental
and Rehabilitative Services
331

Implementation by
Legislature
Commission
was discontinued

12 health and human services
agencies consolidated into four

biennial budgeting
Creation of Office of Finance within
OPM

www.macrothink.org/jpag

Journal of Public Administration and Governance
ISSN 2161-7104
2011, Vol. 1, No. 1

5.4. The Thomas Commission to Study the Management of State Government (1989-1991)
With the passage of more than a decade since the last state reorganization commission, the
state government workforce had grown from 38,300 in 1972 to 54,184 in 1992 (U.S. Census
Bureau, State Summary Table). Accompanying the growth in government employees, the
number of independent boards and commissions created by the legislature mushroomed.
Much like the commissions that preceded it, the impetus for the Thomas Commission was a
fiscal crisis. The legislature appointed a 23 member commission to comprehensively review
the entire state government. Appointed by Governor William O’Neill, DeRoy Thomas,
chairman of the Hartford Insurance Group along with hired consultants studied every state
agency and function from 1989-1991. The commission recommended the centralization of
information technology functions, the appointment of a chief operating officer for the day to
day oversight of state agencies, a return to biennial budgeting, and increased privatization of
services for an overall savings of $500 million a year (Historical Note, Connecticut State
Library, 2007) which were met with skepticism and criticism on the part of the union for its
exclusive focus on cutting expenditures. In a nod to long-range planning, the biennial
budget passed later as Public Act 91-3 in June 1992 as part of a special legislative session.
The work of the Thomas Commission was discontinued and then later restarted under the
Hull-Harper Commission.
5.5. The Hull-Harper Commission to Effect Government Reorganization (1992)
The Harper-Hull Commission was convened to finish the work of the Thomas Commission
whose work was interrupted by the election of third party Governor Lowell Weicker.
Meanwhile, Connecticut was in the midst of the worst recession since the 1930s. As Robert
Kravchuk (1993) recounted Connecticut was deep in the throes of a recession the levels of
which had not been seen since 1930.
At the time of Weicker’s inauguration, Connecticut faced an estimated 1992 budget shortfall
of some 2.4 billion. Representing approximately 38% of projected fiscal year 1992 revenues,
Connecticut’s deficit would be the largest in the state’s history, and the largest percentage
wise in the nation (Kravchuk, 330)
In tandem with the necessary financial reforms spearheaded by Governor Weicker, including
the much maligned income tax, the governor viewed the work of the commission appointed
by his predecessor as necessary to bring state government under fiscal control. As
Kravchuk further observed, state government was viewed as the culprit for Connecticut’s
worsening financial condition.
Many considered the root cause to be a state bureaucracy characterized by lethargy and
inept leadership that lack the flexibility to respond to worsening economic conditions. It
was in fact, contributing to Connecticut’s fiscal decline. Solution of Connecticut’s fiscal
crisis and a comprehensive approach to administrative reform would, therefore, have to go
hand in hand (1993, 331).
Characteristic of fourth wave reform efforts, the Hull-Harper Commission was less ambitious
in scope. According to the Office of Legislative Review report (2002), “While the earlier
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Thomas Commission review studied the internal efficiency and operation of agencies
covering almost 90% of the state’s General Fund budget and employees, the Hull-Harper
mandate was to review fewer agencies and to focus on cross-organizational and coordination
issues.” (Commission to Effect Government Reorganization, Final Report 1992). The
commission established seven task forces to study social services, educational services,
service provider network, substance abuse prevention, information technology, job creation
and standardization of finance, budget and purchasing practices. The major thrust of the
commission was to take a more targeted approach, and thus mainly dealt with the
reorganization of Health and Human Services functions an object of considerable growth. It
also proposed the merger of community and technical colleges, and introduced the
application of Total Quality Management principles such as benchmarking into Connecticut
state government.
Many state agencies began to adopt performance measures as an
overall approach known as Total Quality Management, part of the reinventing government
movement forged by the federal government in the 1990s. Brudney, Hebert, and Wright
(1991) observed the trend of state governments that utilized the principles of reinventing
government popularized by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and first utilized during the time of
the Clinton presidency.
Yet despite its more narrowed focus, the Hull-Harper Commission managed to do what no
previous commission had been able to do before which was to achieve a comprehensive
reorganization of Connecticut state government as defined using Garnett’s criteria.
Chief
among the recommendations were to consolidate the twelve health and human services
agencies into four to avoid duplication and overlapping of services. This resulted in the
consolidation of the three largest human services agencies into one: the Department of
Income Maintenance, Human Resources and Aging. Not acted upon by the legislature was
the proposal to create a consolidated Department of Developmental and Rehabilitative
Services which would combine the departments of mental health and mental retardation and
was vigorously opposed by interest groups (Janicki 2002). The legislature also rejected
Senate Bill 367 which would have reorganized higher education into two components: the
UCONN system and the State University and college system , as well as a proposal to
consolidate the community, technical and two year UCONN branch campuses into five
regional campuses (Janicki 2002) Among the recommendations that passed included the
reintroduction of the biennial budget which had originally been proposed by the Hull-Harper
Commission and the creation of an Office of Finance within the Office of Policy and
Management.
Senate deliberations over Senate Bill 367 reveal some of the struggles between proponents
and opponents of reform that revolve around the merger or consolidation of previously
stand-alone agencies that would be subsumed under larger agencies, particularly the
Department of Aging which legislators viewed as key constituency as they fought to retain it
as a separate agency. Others also questioned whether the claims of greater efficiency and
cost savings would materialize. In contrast to previous reorganization efforts, the
Hull-Harper Commission had the distinct advantage having Senator Joe Harper serve in two
capacities, one in serving as co-chair of the commission and also as a key senator during
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legislative deliberations. This was an important tactic that undoubtedly helped the bill move
through the senate.
His remarks directly address the issue of cost savings that has repeatedly surfaced in
legislative deliberations. Another key factor in the relative success of Hull-Harper as
compared to its predecessor commissions was the active role that Governor Weicker played
in expending considerable time and energy to champion reorganization. In fact, in a rare
move which drew the attention of legislators was the fact that he personally testified before
the committee. This signaled to legislators the degree of seriousness he accorded state
reorganization. Senator Harper references both of these points with the following remarks:
The other thing that I think is important to mention is that the Hull-Harper Commission,
when they made recommendations to us on human services, did so in an extraordinary
manner, at least before the Human Services Committee and we were very pleased to have him
there and Secretary Aronson came in to testify before the committee and at that time I asked
both of those individuals whether they thought there would be a large dollar savings from the
recommendations of the Hull-Harper commission on reorganization of human services.
Both of these individuals said that was not the intention of the commission. It was more the
intention of that committee to look at trying to provide services in a better manner to the
people of Connecticut and savings of dollars, if it occurred, was secondary. (Senate
proceedings, May 2, 1992, p. 97)
The Hull-Harper Commission also departed from previous commissions in the composition
of the commission members. The final report (1992) touted that fact that the group was
“equally representative of these two branches of government and designed to involve the
various and numerous stakeholders in reorganizing state government” (p. 2).
5.6. State Reorganization and the 2010 Gubernatorial Election
With an unprecedented fiscal crisis in state history dwarfing all previous crises in size, scope
and real dollar amounts, Connecticut state government stood at a 3.4 billion dollar deficit
looming for fiscal year 2011. In a report, the National Governor’s Association stated the
following:
Fiscal 2010 presented the most difficult challenge for states’ financial management since the
Great Depression and fiscal 2011 is expected to present states with similar challenges
(National Governors Association 2010, p. vii).
In this environment, state government reorganization figured prominently in the campaign
rhetoric during the 2010 gubernatorial race and was put forth by both candidates as one
means of tackling Connecticut’s fiscal problems. With unemployment at 9.1% and a steady
exodus of businesses leaving Connecticut, job growth was the top issue. Reorganization,
however, was put forth by both candidates as a way to put “Connecticut’s fiscal house in
order” and by so doing enhance the overall economic climate. Republican gubernatorial
candidate Tom Foley was poised to undertake a sweeping overhaul of state government. In
fact, Foley, in an interview with the New Haven Register signaled his intentions of elected by
stating that “declaring a fiscal emergency allows a governor to no longer be bound by union
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contracts”. As part of his campaign’s preparation for a possible win, the Foley camp had a
blueprint for a state reorganization plan that would have effectively reduced from 85 to 20 the
total number of state agencies. The cornerstone of the plan was the creation of councils
consisting of the leadership of existing state departments agencies under major functional
groupings. The establishment of a chief operating officer would oversee the reorganization
of state government (Foley campaign document, October 2010).
6. Governor Malloy and State Reorganization: Incremental Consolidation of Higher
Education
While Malloy’s proposal lacked the specificity of Foley’s, his general position was to reduce
to 51 from 83 the number of executive branch agencies for a total reduction of state
government by 30%. In the early months of his governorship, details of his plan were
unveiled as part of the overall budget proposal for fiscal year 2011-12. A cornerstone of his
reorganization plan is a proposal to reorganize Connecticut’s system of higher education.
To accomplish the overall goal of greater managerial control in higher education and to
eliminate central office hierarchy in order to direct more dollars to teaching, Malloy has
proposed to eliminate the various separate boards that oversee the Connecticut State
University system, the community colleges and Charter Oak State College and combine them
into one Board of Regents (Malloy, February 2011). Malloy stated that such changes could
result in $4.3 million dollars annually. It should be noted that the reorganization of higher
education has been a perennial item on the agenda since the Filer Commission in 1976 first
suggested that economies of scale could be realized through the consolidation and merger of
state universities and colleges. In this respect, the eventual achievement of reorganization of
higher education fits into Berkman and Reenock’s (2004) model of incremental
consolidation.
When the proposal was first unveiled in February, the professors’ union announced its
intentions to mount a strong opposition to any cost cutting measures that would stem from a
higher education reorganization ( Matt Clyburn, The Recorder, Professors’ Union Mobilize to
Oppose Cost Cutting Measures, April 21, 2011). Despite the vociferous opposition to the
plan, An Act Concerning A Reorganization of Connecticut’s System of Public Higher
Education was enacted by the General Assembly in May of 2011.
Perhaps sensing that some of their colleagues may not share the same appetite for reform,
conservative Democratic legislators Duff, Hartley and Slossberg co-sponsored legislation to
grant “all extraordinary powers” to the chief executive that may be necessary to balance the
budget during fiscal crises. (Lockhart 2011). However, in response, Malloy’s administration
viewed the proposal as unnecessary indicating that the current framework affords the
governor adequate authority. Finally, in a special session convened for the purpose of
finalizing the budget, the legislature did grant the governor the authority to make cuts subject
to legislative override.
7. General Lessons from Recent Reorganization Efforts: Routes to Reorganization
The road to reorganization is strewn with overly ambitious plans on the part of commissions,
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a lack of buy in or cooperation from state legislatures, and lingering doubts about the
measurable cost savings that reorganization plans often promise.
As Young (2003)
observed, the success of reorganization is dependent upon many variables the not the least of
which are timing, tactics and adoption mechanisms. Based on previous reorganization
efforts in Connecticut, there have been varying degrees of success. Given the great potential
for failure, the question that emerges from this study is why do governors continue attempt to
reorganize state government? In drawing lessons from past reorganization efforts, Young
(2003) offers the following:
1) Timing – a key element to any successful reorganization effort is starting the process
early in a governor’s term to take advantage of the honeymoon period when
legislative goodwill is at a high level.
Governor Malloy signaled his intentions
during the campaign and announced his plan soon after assuming office in February
in conjunction in his budget address.
2) Partnership with key legislators as part of any process as well as public agencies – the
least successful cases of reorganization did not involve legislators while the most
successful reorganizations placed them in a central role.
3) Utilize an incremental approach to reorganization – allow for partial victories as
opposed to a comprehensive approach where opposition to one section of a legislative
package could undermine the whole effort.
4) Party control of both the governor and the legislature may be more beneficial to the
process and increase the prospects for adoption although this is not an automatic
guarantee.
5) The greater the magnitude of the fiscal crisis the greater the prospects for adoption by
the legislature – the Filer and Harper-Hull Commissions were relatively successful
and occurred during major fiscal crises. Governor Malloy’s reorganization fits the
crisis model and appears to have achieved relative success.
6) Adoption tactics – Young found that the statutory method of adoption is preferable to
executive orders which legislatures view as heavy handed and as he observed the
“legislature takes great umbrage to this mechanism” (2003, 116)
7) Governor’s role – a key element that emerges from this case study in terms of the
likelihood of success is the role the governor plays. “A governor’s determined
involvement is instrumental to the success of restructuring when played out in a
careful strategy of timing, tactical approaches, etc. (2003, 117)
8) Promotional campaigns geared towards enlisting the supporting of various
stakeholders – the greater the buy in by various constituencies the greater the
likelihood of support for the reorganization plan.
Even when governors have not been entirely successful, reorganization efforts do serve to
focus attention on problems and while they may fall short of the goal have resulted in some
efficiency gains through consolidation.
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8. Lessons Drawn from Previous Reorganization Attempts in Connecticut
When governors in Connecticut have succeeded in bringing out administrative reform,
lessons from previous efforts have been gleaned for factors that appear to have been
instrumental in their accomplishment. It is evident from the most successful examples in
the previous historical analysis, the Filer and Hull-Harper Commissions succeeded because
governors championed the reform effort, there was strong bi-partisan support, key legislative
leaders were included as commission members, and they shepherded the work through the
General Assembly. All of these coincided with severe fiscal crises that lent a sense of
urgency to the proceedings and legitimized administrative reform as a means to tackle
budgetary problems.
9. Conclusion
While public policy making tends towards the status quo in general, it is more pronounced
when large scale reform of government is on the agenda. Reforming state government
through efforts to rearrange, consolidate, merge and possibly eliminate state agencies has met
with considerable obstacles primarily the agencies themselves and their clientele groups.
Yet, despite Connecticut’s penchant for steady habits, periodically policy makers have broken
the log jam that has often characterized state government. Reorganizations have been
successful when public officials have attempted it in a more piecemeal and incremental
fashion. Time will tell whether the most recent reorganization effort will be successful.
However, these legislator’s words will serve as sage advice regarding state reorganization:
Efficient government depends on many variables whether good policies are chosen by the
Governor and the legislature, whether competent people can be attracted to state service,
whether federal policies encourage or discourage efficient state operations and whether
service delivery systems are well designed to meet needs. We are not claiming that better
structure is a panacea for all of the problems of state government. Good structure alone
will not necessarily inspire sound decision, or recruit good people or avoid unnecessary
spending or increase effective programs, but it is a good starting point for the improvement of
state government. (Senator Baker, Final Senate debate, May 23, 1977)
10. The Future of State Government Reorganization in the United States
The Connecticut case study is illustrative of larger national trends in state reorganization both
past and present.
Recent developments in Connecticut state government can be viewed as
a microcosm of the major efforts by governors to come to terms with a nation-wide recession
that has had ripple effects on state economies across the country since 2008. In an article
entitled “The Big Reset: State Governments After the Great Recession”, John Thomasian of
the National Governors Association discussed the impact of the so called great recession on
state government reorganization. Noting that the severity and nature of the current recession
is quantitatively and qualitatively different from other recessions, he argues that states need to
take a different approach to remedy the ills currently befalling state government. Instead of
merely reorganizing state government, Thomasian believes that state government needs to be
redesigned entirely in order to meet the needs of the 21st century. The reset premise is
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predicated on the notion that simply reorganizing state government will not be sufficient. In
order to cope with continuing shortfalls in revenue for the foreseeable future, state
governments must engage in a total redesign in order to align their operations to the “new
normal” state of affairs. In order to cope with this new reality, state governments must
undertake a thorough reexamination of core state services. This reexamination entails
deciding whether current budget priorities reflect the right mix of programs and services with
the objective of determining whether there are major restructuring and cost savings available
within each area (Thomasian, p. 15). This is in sharp contrast to traditional reorganization
efforts in which commissions did not delve into such policy decisions and often viewed such
considerations as outside of their scope.
In surveying the actions that state governments have recently taken, he noted that some likely
candidates for downsizing and/or reorganization are corrections, K-12 education and public
higher education. Higher education comprises roughly 11-12 percent of state expenditures,
placing it in third place after K-12 education and Medicaid. In appears that Connecticut
falls into line once again with national trends with the move to reorganize the system of
public higher education during this past legislative session.
A future research agenda is
warranted to analyze the extent to which the higher education reorganization has yielded the
purported benefits and cost savings proponents promised in order to gain passage in the
legislature. What is certain is that Connecticut is in the midst of a significant effort to
reorganize state government that will be a mainstay on the executive and legislative agenda
for the foreseeable future.
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